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THE MACARTHUR COERCION STUDIES:
A WISCONSIN PERSPECTIVE
DAROLD A. TREFFERT, M.D. *
The Admiral noticed an ominous image on the radar screen of
his ship which was clearly on a collision course with what ap-
peared to be another vessel. He radioed ahead: "We are on a
collision course; change your direction 10 degrees to the North."
A message was radioed back: "Yes we are on a collision course;
change your direction 90 degrees to the South." The now irri-
tated Captain radioed a new message: "I am an Admiral; change
your direction 10 degrees to the North." The message came
back: "I am a seaman second class; change your direction 90 de-
grees to the South." An even more enraged Admiral radioed
back: "This is a battleship; change your direction 10 degrees to
the North!" The message came dispassionately back: "This is a
lighthouse; change your direction 90 degrees to the South."
The MacArthur Coercion Studies, to me, represent a lighthouse-like
reality: that major mental illness, by its intrinsic nature and manifesta-
tions, makes the use of coerced care-rather than purely voluntary
treatment-necessary in some instances. No matter how earnestly some
wish that were not so, or some might argue that it ought not to be so, or
some might even legislatively prohibit so it cannot be so, coerced care,
in some small number of cases, necessarily exists-like the lighthouse-
as an unavoidable reality for both psychiatry and the law. That reality,
like the lighthouse, cannot be wished away, argued away, legislated
away, or litigated away. Our task as clinicians, attorneys, and advocates
is to work together to chart as prudent and reasonable a course as possi-
ble that equitably and sensibly balances clinical realities with legal
rights.
The MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Mental Health
* Dr. Treffert, a graduate of the University of Wisconsin Medical School in 1958, served
as the Superintendent of Winnebago Mental Health Institute for fifteen years. He was presi-
dent of the State Medical Society of Wisconsin in 1979-80 and Chairman of the Board of Di-
rectors of that organization from 1981-87. He was president of the Wisconsin Psychiatric As-
sociation and the American Association of Psychiatric Administrators, and was appointed in
1995 by Governor Thompson to the Wisconsin Medical Examining Board.
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and the Law accepts that reality and, in these Coercion Studies, sets out
to more precisely define and study coerced care. Then, it makes rec-
ommendations as to how coerced care, when necessary, can be best
managed to maximize treatment opportunity with patients, while mini-
mizing the detrimental impact on present or future treatment efforts, all
the time respecting important rights and liberties. By systematically,
dispassionately, and meticulously examining the nature of-and need
for-coerced treatment (along with competency standards and violence
risk assessment), in an overdue and enlightened fashion, these Coercion
Studies provide study in place of slogans, data in place of diatribe, and
recommendations in place of recriminations.
There is a Chinese proverb that states: "If we don't change our di-
rection, we are likely to end up where we are headed." The MacArthur
Studies help us change our direction so that "where we are headed" in
this important search-to balance the right to be sick with the right to
be rescued-provides the most prudent, the most sensible, and the most
equitable standards and solutions that we can fashion, on behalf of pa-
tients, their families, and the public, using to the best advantage our pre-
sent state of knowledge in both psychiatry and law. These MacArthur
Studies provide some data, finally, to help us in that important and vital
search. It is with this more objective knowledge, and in this more scien-
tific climate, that the search for the most reasonable midpoint in this
delicate equation can be furthered. It is in that spirit that this confer-
ence was convened.
I. How WE GOT To WHERE WE ARE
By necessity, psychiatry and law, with respect to the severely men-
tally ill, have been linked together for a long time in Wisconsin. That
interface began benevolently in 1873 when then Wisconsin Governor
Barstow sent a committee out to examine the plight of the mentally ill.
What it found was a distressing picture indeed. Most of the mentally ill
were in jails, untreated, and uncared for. Throughout the counties they
visited in Wisconsin, this is what they found:
Men and women unable to take care of themselves in pens
with loose straw for beds and only a blanket to cover their naked
bodies. In some jails the straw was changed daily, but in others
clean straw was put in only once or twice a week. In one county
an insane man and an insane woman were found nude, covered
with their own excrement, huddled in a pile of straw above a pig
pen. In another county the mentally sick persons were locked in
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a room, which in the opinion of the board had not been cleaned
for years.... A sick woman was found in a dark cell in the cellar
of a county jail. She received her food through a hole in the
floor, much like a wild animal receiving food from its keeper....
Inmates frequently killed each other and black eyes and bruises
were evidence of fights and abuse of the 
keepers.'
Dr. Walter Kempster, appointed Superintendent of the Northern
Hospital for the Insane, which opened that year, responded to that re-
port thusly:
Who can think of the number of unfortunate beings now con-
fined in the receptacles of the different counties of this state, and
realize in the most remote degree, the sorrowing hearts their mis-
fortunes have created; of hopes once bright now dashed; of the
ambitions that lured beyond strength; of life's work begun but
left unfinished; of affections ripened only to be blasted-who can
consider these calamities of our fellow mortals, rendered insane
by perhaps no act of their own, unwittingly thrown upon the
charity of the state, bound by the unyielding fetters of a terrible
disease .... Who can think of these things, of the measureless
calamity of insanity, and turn idly away, closing eye and hand,
withholding that which is known to be required to make life com-
fortable? We can conceive of no argument, economical or hu-
manitarian, that can be adduced to show why aid should be post-
poned; why the sufferer must be compelled to suffer on.2
Subsequently, state and county mental hospitals were built, laws
were created, and funds appropriated, so that the mentally ill could be
separated from the jailed-where they had been to that point incarcer-
ated for the crime of being sick-so that they could instead receive
treatment if treatment for their condition was known, or failing that, so
that they could at least be in a place of safety and retreat. Even in those
early days, many such patients came voluntarily, but some required in-
voluntary commitment. Throughout the ensuing century and a quarter
to the present time, clinicians, attorneys, judges, advocates, legislators,
and governors have continually interfaced and interacted with each
1. Darold A. Treffert, The Image of Psychiatry and Its Impact on Patients and Future
Patients, in MOOD DISORDERS: THE WORLD'S MAJOR PUBLIC HEALTH PROBLEM 244,244-
45 (Frank J. Ayd, Jr. & Irving J. Taylor eds., 1978) (quoting First Annual Report, Wisconsin
State Board of Charity and Reform (1873)) [hereinafter Treffert, The Image of Psychiatry).
2. Treffert, The Image of Psychiatry, supra note 1, at 245.
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other, from their respective vantage points, searching to find that rea-
sonable middle ground in the delicate equation of balancing certain
rights-the right to be sick with the right to be rescued; the right to be
free with the right of the patient and those around him or her to be
safely protected; the right to receive treatment with the right to refuse
treatment-for those few patients who do, because of severe mental ill-
ness, require involuntary, or coerced, treatment.
Which brings us to this conference today, still searching, still dia-
loguing-"sifting and winnowing" we call it in Wisconsin-because
some involuntary or coerced treatment, remains necessary in some small
number of cases of major mental illness.
II. WHERE ONE STANDS DEPENDS ON WHERE ONE SITS
For seventeen years I was Director of Winnebago Mental Health In-
stitute, which serves thirty-seven counties in the east and north half of
Wisconsin; it was to the mental health system what "University Hospi-
tal" or its equivalent is to the general health system-a tertiary care cen-
ter for specialized treatment for persons with particularly complex con-
ditions. Then for twelve years, I was director of a community mental
health system for a county of 90,000 persons providing inpatient, outpa-
tient, transitional, and a wide range of other services for persons with
mental illness, developmental disability, alcohol, or drug problems.
Throughout those years, and continuing to the present, I was also in pri-
vate practice with both outpatients in the office and inpatients in a gen-
eral hospital psychiatric unit when such care was necessary. So my van-
tage point-where I sit-is that of a clinician and an administrator in a
wide variety of public and private, hospital and community, outpatient,
and inpatient settings.
In each of those settings, including the Institute, the vast majority of
patients were voluntary. But mental illness being what it is, in some
relatively few instances, involuntary or coerced treatment becomes nec-
essary. The circumstance of a patient who goes into the Emergency
Room with chest pain, and to whom it is recommended he or she should
stay in the hospital, but decides to go home instead is not the same as
another patient in that same Emergency Room, cowering in the comer,
hissing but otherwise mute, acting on delusions and responding to hallu-
cinations. That latter patient, severely ill with a psychotic disorder, sim-
ply cannot, because of a disorder of the brain itself, make the same
clear-headed judgment that the non-psychotic, but probably nonetheless
still anxious, cardiac patient can make. Fortunately, the number of pa-
tients who require coerced treatment among the mentally ill is small
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compared to those entirely competent to choose whether or not to re-
ceive treatment. With the increasingly effective, well-tolerated, and safe
treatments now available for major mental illness such as severe depres-
sion, manic-depressive disorder, and schizophrenia-along with in-
creasing community resources and support systems which make such
treatments even more accessible-the number of patients requiring in-
voluntary treatment is being reduced even further.
From the public defender's vantage point, the issues look somewhat
different than they do to me as a clinician. The task for the public de-
fender is to see that all due process is provided, legal rights are fully pro-
tected, and the least restrictive alternative used. To the civil libertarian,
the issue is broader still: to make sure civil commitment does not be-
come applicable to merely odd or eccentric behavior, or be substituted
too easily or too casually in those persons who, even though mentally ill,
maintain the capacity to make choices whether we agree with those
choices or not.
But for each of us-clinician, attorney, advocate-from our respec-
tive vantage points, the task, it seems to me, is identical: to find, given
what knowledge we have about mental illness and the law, that best and
most reasonable midpoint in the delicate equation of balancing clinical
realities and legal rights. Finally, these MacArthur Studies provide
some data to help us in that task.
III. THE PENDULUM SWINGS-BOTH WAYS
I visited my first institution for the mentally ill when I was a junior
medical student in 1957. There were no antidepressants, no anti-
psychotics, no MRIs or CAT scans. Length of stay was measured in
years. Insulin therapy was popular; the only medications available were
sedatives and hypnotics. The total population in state and county men-
tal hospitals nationwide was 560,000 persons, having increased each of
the previous 100 years. But about that same time, in the search for a
less sedating antihistamine, "tranquilizers" were accidentally discovered
and chlorpromazine, the first anti-psychotic and the first definitive rem-
edy for some forms of major mental illness, began to be widely used. Its
impact on psychiatry in the 1950s and beyond was as dramatic as the
impact of penicillin and other antibiotics in the rest of medicine begin-
ning a decade earlier.
Almost simultaneously, antidepressants were discovered. Definitive
treatments were now available for two of the most common forms of
major mental illness. With the use of those medications, psychiatric
hospital populations began to decrease in the same manner as happened
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with TB sanitoria census after the introduction of streptomycin. For
the first time in a century, state and county mental hospital populations
began to decrease because of these new anti-psychotic and antidepres-
sant medications. Today, 77,000 persons, a decline of eighty-seven per-
cent, reside in such hospitals nationwide.4 Length of stay began to
shorten first to months, then to weeks, and now to days. Treatment foci
changed from inpatient to community settings. Mental health teams be-
gan to make house calls; storefront clinics existed right in the patient's
neighborhood. Some of the stigma of mental illness began to decline,
and more optimism, acceptance, and hope emerged. The pendulum
swung optimistically toward more effective treatment for the mentally
ill, and availability and access to such treatment improved markedly in
the 1950s and 60s.
But a disquieting backward swing of that pendulum began about that
same time as well. Prior to 1970, civil commitment criteria, in Wisconsin
and throughout the nation, were constitutionally too vague, due process
provisions were too few, and standards for civil commitment too broad.
Mental Health Acts in all the states overemphasized parens patriae
powers and too easily invoked police powers. Those statutes were defi-
cient not only in substantive due process, but in procedural due process
as well. For example, in Wisconsin the statutes stated simply that invol-
untary commitment could occur when a mentally ill person "require[d]
care and treatment for his own welfare, or the welfare of others, or of
the community" and that person was "a proper subject for custody and
treatment."5 Mental illness was much too loosely defined, and due pro-
cess was scant. There were no requirements, for example, for prompt
hearings, notice of the allegations, the right to an attorney, the right to
remain silent, and the right of making the state bear the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
While there had been efforts underway in Wisconsin by a number of
persons, including me, to revise that statute in the late 1960s and early
1970s, the law was challenged in a class action suit in 1972 when those
revisions did not occur through the legislative process. In response to
the challenge that the law was unconstitutionally vague, a federal district
court handed down the Lessard decision involving due process rights of
3. See Treffert, The Image of Psychiatry, supra note 1, at 247.
4. See Leona L. Bachrach, Ph. D., The State of the State Mental Hospital in 1996, 47
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1071, 1073 (Oct. 1996).
5. Mental Health Act, WIS. STAT. § 51.75, Art. 11 (f) (1971).
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the mentally ill.6 Instead of merely finding the statute to be unconstitu-
tionally vague, however, the court, in a rather sweeping move, went one
step further and construed the statute to imply a finding of
dangerousness-inserting the exceedingly narrow language that for in-
voluntary civil commitment to occur, there had to be "an extreme likeli-
hood that if the person is not confined, he will do immediate harm to
himself or others based on a finding of a recent overt act, attempt or
threat to do substantial harm to oneself or others."7 In so doing, the
Lessard decision inappropriately-in my view and in the view of others
as well-converted parens patriae powers in the Wisconsin civil com-
mitment statute into police powers without ever specifically addressing
the constitutionality of parens patriae absent the vagueness which admit-
tedly was present in that statute." The case ultimately made its way to
the United States Supreme Court, which vacated and remanded it twice
in 1974 and 1975.' Eventually, the Wisconsin Legislature responded to
the Lessard decision by creating a statute with imminent physical
dangerousness, to self or others (homicidal or suicidal), as the only two
criteria for civil commitment. In addition to limiting civil commitment
to these narrow imminent physical dangerousness requirements, signifi-
cant new due process provisions were also added, including prompt
probable cause hearings, thorough judicial review before final commit-
ment, enumeration of patient's rights, provision of least restrictive alter-
natives, a specified length of commitment, and clearly delineated emer-
gency detention provisions."0
Many other states, acting on cases within their own jurisdiction or
patterning laws after Lessard, revised their commitment statues as well,
embodying commitment criteria based on imminent physical risk-dan-
ger to self, danger to others-also including, as well, new due process
provisions. 1 It soon became apparent, however, in Wisconsin and
around the country, that this abrupt swing of the pendulum-from the
6. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on re-
mand to, 379 F. Supp 1376 (1974), vacated 421 U.S. 957 (1975), on remand to 413 F. Supp.
1318 (1976).
7. Id. at 1093.
8. See Darold A. Treffert, The Obviously 11l Patient in Need of Treatment: A Fourth
Standard for Civil Commitment, 36 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 259,260 (Mar. 1985).
9. Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); 421 U.S. 957 (1975). See also RAEL JEAN
ISAAC & VIRGINIA C. ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS: How PSYCHIATRY AND THE
LAW ABANDONED THE MENTALLY ILL 127 (1990).
10. See WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.001-51.95 (1997-98).
11. Darold A. Treffert & Richard W. Krajeck, In Search of a Sane Commitment Statute,
6 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 56-81 (June 1976).
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standard for civil commitment being far too broad to now so narrow
("imminent physical dangerousness only")-was too restrictive and far
too harsh, ignoring some obvious clinical realities. I began to collect a
series of cases of what I called "dying with your rights on"-situations in
which scrupulous concern for the patient's rights overshadowed reason-
able concern for the patient's life.12 This tragic catalog of cases has con-
tinued to grow.13
Along with these cases, there also was an increase in admissions of
mentally ill persons into jails and prisons (a step a century backward to
1873) because of dangerousness criteria too narrowly defined. 14 Due to
civil commitment criteria now too stringent, criminal observation provi-
sions in the law were being used instead of civil commitment procedures
for some of the mentally ill. Some mentally ill persons, having been ar-
rested for minor offenses such as vagrancy, shoplifting, disorderly con-
duct, or failure to pay a restaurant bill, for example, would either be di-
rectly jailed-if for no other reason than their own safety-or in some
instances such persons would be sent to psychiatric facilities for criminal
observation under the Wisconsin Statute Chapter 957 provisions. In
tabulating criminal observation commitments at three Wisconsin state
institutions after the Lessard decision, there was an increase of seventy-
eight percent in criminal observation cases at Winnebago, Mendota and
Central State Hospital, rising from 200 such cases annually pre-Lessard
to 367 such cases in 1977, two years after that decision. 15 However, this
number represents only the tip of the iceberg, as the vast majority of
"arrests" for minor offenses of obviously mentally ill persons, as an ad-
mitted effort on the part of law enforcement persons to get needy per-
sons into a safe environment and hopefully even into a stream of treat-
ment, occurred at the city and county level with incarceration being
handled locally.
12. See Darold A. Treffert, Dying with One's Rights On, 224 JAMA 1649 (1973). See
also Darold A. Treffert, The Practical Limits of Patient's Rights 5 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 91-
96 (1975); Darold A. Treffert, Dying with Their Rights On, 2 PRISM 49-52 (Feb. 1974) (here-
inafter Treffert, Dying with Their Rights On].
13. See Darold A. Treffert, Dying With Your Rights On, Still, (paper presented at the
140th annual meeting of the American Psychiatric Association, Chicago, May 9-14,1987).
14. See Marc F. Abramson, The Criminalization of Mentally Disordered Behavior: Pos-
sible Side-Effects of New Mental Health Law, 23 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 101, 104
(1972). See also Jennifer Caldwell Bonovitz & Edward B. Guy, Impact of Restrictive Civil
Commitment Procedures on a Prison Psychiatric Service, 136 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 1045,
1046-47 (1979).
15. See Darold A. Treffert, Legal "Rites": Criminalizing the Mentally Ill, 3 HILLSIDE J.
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 123-37 (1982) [hereinafter Treffert, Legal "Rites"].
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This criminalization of the mentally ill, ironically at a time when so-
ciety had de-criminalized alcoholism and drug abuse, has continued.
Nationwide, in 1998, as many as six to fifteen percent of persons in city
and county jails, and ten to fifteen percent of persons in state prisons,
had severe mental illness. 6 And those percentages do not include a
whole new influx of persons-sexual predators now being defined as
"mentally ill"-into jails, prisons or some hybrid institutions specially
created for that purpose. Since the law went into effect in 1997, 188 per-
sons have already been detained under observation or committed status
under Wisconsin Statute 950 provisions at either the Wisconsin Re-
source Center or the Mendota Mental Health Institute." It is projected
there will be forty-eight such new commitments annually."8 In other
states, as well, the new mentally ill sexual predator classification is cre-
ating a large population of such persons either in existing prisons, new
special facilities, or even worse, filling beds in already overburdened
mental hospitals.
One additional element of this harsh pendulum swing warrants men-
tion-substitution of what might be called legal "rites" for patient
rights. 9 From a time when due process was woefully lacking, the pen-
dulum swung rather drastically in the opposite direction-in some in-
stances, toward providing now more process than is due or necessary.
One example of the extreme to which the legal "rites" pendulum over-
compensated occurred in a Milwaukee courtroom in 1981.
The patient was in jail, had a prior diagnosis of schizophrenia, was
obviously ill to anyone viewing him, and refused to eat, bathe, or com-
municate. He stared blankly at the ceiling. A jailor saw him eating fe-
ces from a toilet bowl. A psychiatric evaluation was ordered and a court
proceeding occurred:
[Public Defender]: "Would the eating of fecal material on one
occasion by an individual pose a serious risk of harm to that per-
son?"
[Doctor]: "It is certainly not edible material .... It contains
elements that are considered harmful or unnecessary."
[Public Defender]: "But doctor, you cannot state whether the
16. See H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. Wienberger, Persons With Severe Mental Illness in
Jails and Prisons: A Review, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 483-84 (1998).
17. Interview with Phillip Macht, Director, Wisconsin Resource Center, Oshkosh, Wis-
consin (Dec. 7,1998).
18. Id.
19. See generally Treffert, Legal "Rites," supra note 15.
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consumption of such material on one occasion would invariably
harm a person?"
[Doctor]: "Certainly not on one occasion. ' 2°
The Public Defender then moved to dismiss the action on the
grounds that the patient was in no immediate danger of physical injury
or dying. The case was dismissed. That patient, after two subsequent
arrests, was sent to a state hospital for observation on a charge of disor-
derly conduct-failure to pay a restaurant bill-and was finally given
medication to which he had responded well previously. He was success-
fully treated and released."
As a reaction to some of these trends, an additional standard-
gravely disabled-was added to Chapter 51, Wisconsin's Mental Health
Act as a third standard for involuntary commitment.2 However, this
third standard also was predicated only on physical harm. Many other
states added such a third standard also.' Wisconsin added an additional
criteria in 1996-the so-called "obviously ill" or "need-for-treatment"
standard-wherein a patient with a documented history of mental
illness, who was deteriorating but not yet dangerous, could be detained
for a thirty-day period if a petition for such detention was approved by
the Attorney General's office within twelve hours of filing. This
provision is generally referred to as the "Fifth Standard" in Wisconsin
because there are two gravely disabled standards in Wisconsin law;
nationwide this is generally referred to as the fourth standard. 24 Eight
other states have added such an "obviously ill" or "need-for-treatment"
fourth standard to add to the generally available three other standards
existent in all states: (1) danger to self; (2) danger to others; and (3)
gravely disabled.2- Experience with this Fifth Standard in Wisconsin will
be discussed in more detail later in this paper.
Overall, then, between 1972 and 1996 the pendulum swung clearly in
the direction of more restrictive commitment criteria, more attention to
legal rights (what in some instances have deteriorated into what I call
20. Dan Patnnos & Mary Zahn, Man Moves In, Out of System, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL,
Aug. 19, 1981, at 16.
21. See id.
22. See WIS. STATS. § 51.20 (1997-98).
23. See Treffert & Krajeck, supra note 11, at 56.
24. Darold A. Treffert, 1995 Wisconsin Act 292: Finally, the Fifth Standard, 95 WiSC.
MED. J. 537-40 (1996) [hereinafter Treffert, Fifth Standard].
25. Robert D. Miller, Our Seriously Ill Patients Need This Legislation, 32 WisC.
PSYCHIATRIST 14-19 (1991).
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"legal rites"), essentially prohibiting parens patriae interventions by re-
quiring instead that narrowly defined imminent physical dangerousness
be used as the sole basis on which involuntary intervention was permit-
ted. The irony in this is that at a time when definitive treatment for
major mental illness did not exist-from the 1850s until the 1950s-the
authority to intervene was then too broad, the standards too liberal, and
statutes constitutionally too vague. Yet beginning in the 1950s, after
prompt, safe, and effective treatments became available for many forms
of major mental illness, mental health statutes too stringent and too
cumbersome and prevented, or unnecessarily delayed, such treatment.
Thus, at a time such as now, when civil commitment for "care and
treatment" would not be a euphemism for the ability to merely to con-
fine, the right to refuse treatment cancels out the right to receive treat-
ment in many instances. The MacArthur Studies should help in that re-
gard by making right to refuse treatment determinations more uniform,
more standardized, and more readily definable.
There is some evidence that the pendulum, which did swing so vig-
orously backward beginning with Lessard, has already begun a correc-
tion from permitting only police powers toward a return to some parens
patriae considerations once again in a counterbalancing manner.' Out-
patient commitments, protective placements, and limited guardianships
have been newly forged, or creatively adapted, that allow outpatient
treatment for persons with severe mental illness without having to meet
more stringent inpatient involuntary commitment criteria.' By 1995,
thirty-five states and the District of Columbia had such outpatient com-
mitment provisions.'
Indeed, even when those are not available or applicable, there is
ample evidence that clinicians, attorneys, and judges-when apparent
and indicated-incorporate parens patriae and patient welfare concerns
into existing civil commitment criteria when only "imminent physical
dangerousness" criteria, on the surface, are too harsh. A recent study
confirms previous findings that some judges, faced with various statu-
tory and non-statutory considerations, in certain individual circum-
26. See generally Paul S. Appelbaum, Civil Commitment Is the Pendulum Changing Di-
rections? 33 HOsP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 703 (1982). See also John Q. LaFond, Law
and the Delivery of Mental Health Services, 64 AMER. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 209-22
(1994).
27. See generally E. Fuller Torrey & Robert J. Kaplan, A National Survey of the Use of
Outpatient Commitment, 46 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 778 (1995). See also ISAAC & ARMAT,
supra note 9, at 313-16.
28. See Torrey & Kaplan, supra note 27, at 778.
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stances can go "beyond the black letter of the law." The study also
demonstrates that the parens patriae model more closely describes the
individual judge's decision making process than the "police powers"
model. Contextual variables such as the patient's family favoring com-
mitment, can be influential as well.29 In an even wider international con-
text, Paul S. Appelbaum also argues that the pendulum may be swinging
back again, in that reforms toward police powers, away from the "health
and safety" needs of the patient, are resisted and have not dominated
reform in most other nations.' When the law fails to reflect such patient
health, safety, and treatment concerns, it is "molded" in practice to bet-
ter incorporate "treatment needs" over narrow physical dangerousness
criteria and stringent procedural rights.
Thus, the pendulum-in this ongoing search for a reasonable mid-
point in the delicate balance between clinical realities and legal rights-
has, these past 125 years, swung forward, then back, and then forward
again. But rather than remaining constant, each time the pendulum
goes back, however far, the next time it moves forward a bit further,
progress-wise, than it had ever been before. It is with that awkward gait
that this search, like all of man's inquiries, is propelled along, letting us
adjust our direction slightly each time, so eventually we end up in that
place to which we properly ought to be headed. These MacArthur
Studies help in adjusting properly this particular journey's direction.
IV. DEFINING "COERCION"--THE FIRST, NECESSARY STEP
This MacArthur Study begins right where it should, by defining co-
ercion. My tendency, both as a clinician and administrator, when I first
read these Studies, was to page ahead to the end of the report to see
what effect coercion had on the outcome of treatment efforts. While
impact on treatment effectiveness may be an ultimate bottom line ques-
tion with respect to coercion--does it help or hinder?-this early report
correctly points out that before trying to assess whether coerced treat-
ment "works," it is necessary to determine what makes people feel co-
erced as a prerequisite to meaningfully studying the impact of coercion.
So I commend the researchers here for reminding us to carefully define
terms before leaping to. studying outcome. It is clear from these Studies,
29. See Harold J. Bursztajn et al., Beyond the Black Letter of the Law: An Empirical
Study of an Individual Judge's Decision Process for Civil Commitment Hearings, 25 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 79, 89-90 (1997).
30. See Paul S. Appelbaum, Almost a Revolution: An International Perspective on the
Law of Involuntary Commitment, 25 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 135,138 (1997).
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and our general observations in practice, that equating coerced care
with civil commitment status is too crude a standard. Some persons en-
ter the hospital "voluntarily" because they have been told unless they do
so they will be involuntarily committed. Others "volunteer" as a condi-
tion of probation, or as a condition of licensure in the case of some pro-
fessional persons, or to save a marriage "by getting some help."
While "voluntary" in terms of the letter of the law, threats and in-
timidation at worst, and persuasion at best, can make the voluntary na-
ture of some admissions coerced care. Contrariwise, as these Studies
point out, sometimes an "involuntary" process is used on paper, with
full consent of the patient, to achieve some transportation, fiscal, juris-
dictional or other purpose. Any attempt to define coercion by legal
status alone becomes even more problematic in Wisconsin when one,
remembers that this state had, in its statutes-until the 1970s-a "volun-
tary commitment" (a real oxymoron) provision for persons with alco-
holism under which the person would voluntarily commit (not admit)
himself or herself to the hospital for at least a thirty-day stay during
which time such persons could be detained on this "voluntary commit-
ment" even if they asked for their release. It truly was a "voluntary
commitment."
The beginning of wisdom is to call things by their right name. I
commend the MacArthur Group for beginning the study of coercion in
mental health care by first carefully defining it, and then by expanding
and refining that definition to include perceived coercion as a valid area
of inquiry in this important topic area rather than simply equating "co-
ercion" with involuntary commitment status. Coercion can occur with
voluntary admission status as well, as these Studies convincingly point
out, and on occasion the committed patient may have experienced little
or no coercion in spite of the "involuntary" status.
A. Coerced Care-Beyond Inpatient Status
Actual or perceived coercion can be measured differentially between
inpatients on a voluntary versus committed status. This is a good start-
ing point, as in present day practice "coerced care" increasingly occurs
on an outpatient, in-community basis. Outpatient commitment exists in
many states now, sometimes with criteria identical to. inpatient stan-
dards, but sometimes with criteria somewhat less stringent. In even
wider use than outpatient commitment, is an adaptation of Wisconsin's
Chapter 55, the "Protective Services or Placement Act." This Act had
been originally intended to apply principally to the elderly and devel-
opmentally disabled. In Dane County, Wisconsin, for example, with its
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integrated system of community care, the mechanism of a limited
guardianship under Chapter 880 and Chapter 55 has been used to ap-
point a guardian limited to consenting or refusing medication. In 1989,
350 of Dane County's approximately 1500 chronic mentally ill-almost
twenty-five percent-were under some sort of compulsory medication
order including protective placement, regular commitment orders, or
ninety-day "settlement agreements."3'
Because of some curtailments in the use of protective placements for
medication compliance, due to several court decisions, 1996 data for
Dane County still showed twenty-four percent (373 of 1537 seriously ill
patients) under an involuntary court finding that provided compulsory
medication administration, but the distribution was somewhat different
among those orders: One hundred and nineteen civil commitments,
seventy-five settlement agreements, one hundred and fifty-eight protec-
tive services or placements, and twenty-one conditional releases.32
Therefore, in attempting to define "coerced care" as the first step in
evaluating its impact on care and outcome of care, the MacArthur group
will need to go beyond the more traditional voluntary versus committed
inpatient populations-where that distinction is already blurred as noted
above-to include "coerced care" among "involuntary" outpatient
populations who are under either specific outpatient commitment stat-
utes or creatively tailored protective placements.
B. Coerced Care-an Oxymoron?
The term "coerced" is defined as "to cause a person to yield to pres-
sure." Coerced treatment sounds like it would, on the face of it, be a
failure. Yet some of my most grateful patients received coerced care:
He was a middle aged professional man with a severe alcohol
problem. His wife accompanied him to the appointment. He
had already lost his position with his company, had largely dissi-
pated the family savings, had severely compromised his reputa-
tion and was now about to lose his family as well. The bottom
line, the spouse insisted, was that unless he signed himself into
the hospital for detoxification and treatment, she and the chil-
dren were moving out. The promises of stopping drinking on his
own, going to A.A., getting outpatient help, and generally
31. See ISAAC AND ARMAT, supra note 9.
32. Personal communication, David LaCount, Administrator, Dane County Mental
Health System, Dec. 2, 1998.
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"shaping up" were no longer good enough. They had all been
tried. They all had failed-repeatedly. I pointed out his profes-
sional license was likely next to go, after his family, then his
health. He reluctantly agreed. He signed himself into the hospi-
tal. It is now seventeen years of sobriety, success at work, and
fulfillment at home later. He stops by once a year to let me know
how well he is doing and how grateful he is we all insisted-we
all "coerced"-him into care, and then recovery.
In reading these MacArthur Studies, I realize now that "coercion"
worked in this case because we-family, clinician, employer-used a
generous amount of what is usefully and appropriately defined and out-
lined in these Studies as "procedural justice"-genuine concern, good
faith, respect, listening to his side of the story, involving important per-
sons in his life in the decision making process, and using persuasion and
inducements rather than legal maneuvers or force. With those elements
in the persuasion process, coerced care need not be an oxymoron. Or
consider this case:
A catatonic patient, hissing and spitting in the Emergency
Room, obviously psychotic now that he has gone off his medica-
tions, which have so well controlled his symptoms in the past,
cannot be detained, in spite of the pleas of who have seen this all
before with Dad when he stopped taking his meds, because the
police officer says hissing and spitting is not against the law, and
the patient is threatening no one. It is obvious to all, though, that
hallucinations and delusions are rampant and out of control. The
patient, otherwise mute, simply stares blankly at the voluntary
admission form. The patient should return home, the family is
advised, "until he gets worse." He does, of course, get worse.
After several days of not eating or drinking, floridly psychotic
but still mute, he develops a fever. An ambulance is called; he is
admitted to a medical unit of a general hospital because it is
thought, he might have had a stroke. His catatonia resembled
those symptoms. Then, after a four-day delay on a medical unit
during which the family watches Dad deteriorate further, he fi-
nally legally qualifies for transfer to a psychiatric unit where a
treatment order is obtained.
The patient responds within hours, promptly and dramati-
cally, as he always had before, to the medication. The voices dis-
appear; the bizarre behavior ceases. A hospitalization, which
could have taken a few days if prompt treatment had been given,
takes several weeks. That patient-and his family too-are
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grateful for the "coerced care" that finally came, late as it was.
The patient asked me, when he recovered, why we didn't do
something sooner. "Because we were protecting your liberties", I
replied. "Being sick like that, Doc, isn't 'liberty' at all," he re-
torted.
C. Is No Care Preferable To Coerced Care?
Few would argue that voluntary treatment with a fully consenting
patient is preferable to any sort of coerced care. The cases above point
out that in some instances, even coerced care can be effective, and, in
retrospect, appreciated. The MacArthur Studies intend to more care-
fully define the nature, extent, and effect of coercion on mental health
treatment and that inquiry is welcome. Nevertheless, I would submit
that if one is to look fully at the impact of voluntary versus coerced care
on the mentally ill, one has to study that with one other crucial variable
at risk as well-the impact of no care at all. Admittedly, that is difficult
to achieve. But if one is looking at the outcome of treatment, it would
be truly comprehensive only if one compared and contrasted the effects
of voluntary care, coerced care (including but not limited to involuntary
commitment) and no care on similar populations.
Let me provide an example of no care. Two young women in a uni-
versity community were observed standing on a street corner in the
campus area, staring in catatonic fashion at each other for over an hour.
A crowd gathered creating considerable confusion at the busy intersec-
tion. Eventually, the police were called and took the pair to a nearby
precinct for questioning, but the women would give nothing more then
their names; they refused to speak and sat mutely staring into space.
The police concluded that some type of psychiatric observation was in-
dicated, but when they contacted the city attorney's office and the
prosecuting attorney's office, the opinion from both was the same. State
law allowed persons to be held for observation only if they appeared
obviously dangerous to themselves or others. In this case, while the
overall behavior was clearly bizarre, they were, after all, only staring at
each other, and were not voicing any threats against themselves or oth-
ers. Since neither homicidal nor suicidal tendencies were apparent, it
was the opinion of both attorneys that the women did not qualify for ob-
servation. Reluctantly, the police released them.
Some hours later the police were called to a campus apartment
where the two women were found on the floor screaming in pain, their
clothes ablaze from a self-made butcher paper pyre they had lit oblig-
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ingly for each other in a suicide pact. Both women were taken to hospi-
tals in critical condition. One recovered; the other died. She died with
her rights on.33
This is one example from my tragic catalog of over 200 cases of per-
sons who, what I call, "died with their rights on." I have hundreds of
such cases previously reported in different articles. Civil libertarians
and other critics refer to these cases as Treffert's "anecdotes." They
dislike them. The cases are jarring. They are "out-hers," not common,
and do not represent the mainstream circumstance, these critics say.
They interfere with philosophical musings. But the instances are real.
They do exist. These persons, with such tragic outcomes, are not "anec-
dotes" to their families and loved ones, or to innocent persons or by-
standers sometimes harmed by them. So I continue to track and report
them.
It is curious to me that these "dying with your rights on" cases are
viewed so dismissively by critics because they are mere "anecdotes"--a
single instance from which one draws much broader conclusions. Com-
paratively, a class action suit, such as Lessard, is also a single instance
from which broader conclusions are drawn and sweeping remedies are
applied. Clinicians call them cases; attorneys call them class action suits.
So what have the courts said in these legal cases? On the issue of in-
voluntary treatment, and the requisite criteria for such confinement, in
Addington v. Texas, 4 Chief Justice Burger of the United States Supreme
Court stated that "[t]he state has a legitimate interest under parens pa-
triae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable, because of
emotional disorders, to care for themselves; the state also has authority
under its police power to protect the community from the dangerous
tendencies of some who are mentally ill.' It is not, then, either parens
patriae or police powers, as the Lessard decision ruled in throwing out
parens patriae concerns entirely, but rather, that there is a legitimate
role for both parens patriae and police powers in appropriate circum-
stances, as the decision in Addington allows. In a footnote to O'Connor
v. Donaldson,36 the United States Supreme Court echoed that finding,
stating that involuntary treatment may sometimes be necessary "if for
physical or other reasons he is helpless to avoid the hazards of free-
33. See Treffert, Dying With Their Rights On, supra note 12, at 49.
34. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
35. Id. at 426.
36. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
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Many of these "dying with your rights on" cases demonstrate graphi-
cally, and tragically, that freedom can be a hazard-or another form of
imprisonment-for persons who are obviously ill and in need of treat-
ment; who are not yet dangerous but well on their way to being so, and
who, because of that obviously and permeating illness, are unable to
care for themselves. The Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry
(GAP) report, which the MacArthur Studies cite in the introduction to
their work, concluded that "sometimes involuntary psychiatric treat-
ment is necessary, can be effective, and can lead to freedom from the
constraints of illness. Conversely, tight restrictions against coercive
treatment can have disastrous consequences."3'
The bad news is that some disastrous consequences continue to oc-
cur in some cases. The good news is that the addition of the third-
"gravely disabled"-standard and now the fourth "need for treatment"
standard in some states for the "obviously ill" but not yet dangerous pa-
tient, along with outpatient commitment, protective placements, and
limited guardianships alluded to above, have reduced that number. Yet
in spite of those alternatives, there remain some instances of no treat-
ment or intervention, when such treatment and intervention clearly
ought to occur. Sometimes that is because of the law, sometimes it is
because of lack of facilities or resources, and sometimes it is because of
advocacy too strident, or in my view, misapplied.
One of the reasons I find these MacArthur Studies so useful and
promising is that now data can be collected on the whole spectrum of
voluntary treatment, involuntary treatment, and no treatment at all.
The data can be compared and contrasted with respect to impact, out-
come, and, eventually, even costs. Data can put anecdotes in perspec-
tive, and it can put philosophical musings in perspective as well. That
would be a welcome substitution for both anecdotes and musings.
In order to accomplish that, though, these MacArthur Studies, as
they proceed, when studying the spectrum of care from entirely volun-
tary to entirely coerced, and all the hybrid variations between those two
alternatives that have developed now, will need to include "no care,"
along with voluntary and coerced care, as a part of the study and control
groups. "No care" is a legitimate, realistic, and actual part of the full
37. Id. at 574 n.9 (emphasis added).
38. COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT POLICY, GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
PSYCHIATRY; FORCED INTO TREATMENT: THE ROLE OF COERCION IN CLINICAL
PRACTICE, No. 137 at 43 (1994).
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spectrum of possibilities when assessing or examining the total spectrum
of care-or lack thereof-for the mentally ill today. While setting up
such a research protocol prospectively would pose difficult if not impos-
sible ethical problems (randomly assigning seriously ill persons to no
treatment) certainly there should be much retrospective data that can be
analyzed, comparing and contrasting outcome for reasonably matched
persons between voluntary care, coerced care, and no care at all. For
example, if one were comparing success rates of surgical versus medical
approaches to coronary artery disease, in order to honestly assess the
relative effectiveness of those treatments, one would necessarily have to
include a group of patients in which there was no intervention at all. It
is no different with mental illness, it seems to me, and I hope and rec-
ommend, that the MacArthur Studies include "no treatment" as one of
the dependent variables in assessing treatment outcome and effective-
ness with these populations.
Certainly with involuntary treatment and coerced care there is much
to be cautious about. Such interventions cannot be allowed to be arbi-
trary, capricious, casual, or employed merely for convenience or econo-
mies. Painstaking protection of patients' civil rights and use of the least
restrictive alternative in each and every case is essential to be sure. But
equally important-no more, no less-is the task of ensuring reasoned,
restrained but appropriate care and intervention for the seriously men-
tally ill patient when severe and tragic consequences will ensue to the
patient or those around him or her in the absence of treatment. The
MacArthur Studies provide some direction and guidance in propor-
tioning out that delicate equation.
V. THE MACARTHUR STUDIES To DATE: MEANINGFUL FINDINGS To
THE CLINICIAN
Each person, looking at the MacArthur Studies to date, again de-
pending on one's vantage point, is probably struck by different findings.
To me, as a clinician and administrator, the following are particularly
significant:
A. The Vast Majority of Psychiatric Admissions are Voluntary
Of 1.1 million civil inpatient admissions in 1980, seventy-three per-
cent (broadly construed) were voluntary although that proportion varies
depending on the type of facility. For example, the voluntary admission
percentage in state and county facilities was 38.4%; Community Mental
Health Centers 53.9%; General Hospital Psychiatric units 85.2%; and
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VA units 94.4%. While some adjustments need to be made for the fact
that "voluntary" and "involuntary" designations are not entirely accu-
rate for a variety of reasons discussed above, the fact is that the vast
majority of inpatient and outpatient treatment is not coerced and occurs
as a voluntary contract between patient, facility or agent, and therapist.
B. Patient Interviews are a More Accurate Measure of "Coercion" than
Legal Status
In interviewing 157 newly admitted patients, forty-nine percent of
voluntary patients indicated someone other than themselves had initi-
ated coming to the hospital; four percent were in some form of custody
at the time of presentation; twenty-five percent felt there were reason-
able alternatives to hospitalization and ten percent perceived themselves
to have been coerced using the perceived coercion scales. On the other
hand, twenty-two percent of the involuntary patients indicated it was
their idea to come to the hospital and forty-seven percent felt there were
no reasonable alternatives to hospitalization. Thirty-five percent did not
perceive themselves as having been coerced into the hospital; fifty-six
percent said they would have entered the hospital voluntarily if they had
been given that opportunity. Therefore, patient interviews, using the
MacArthur tools, in the present and any future studies, to measure co-
ercion provide a much more meaningful assessment of those factors
than looking at legal status alone.
C. Involuntary Commitment is not Synonymous with Denial and Protest
Involuntarily committed patients do not invariably deny their illness
and protest the hospitalization process. Thirty-four percent believed
they were mentally ill; twenty-two percent indicated it was their idea to
come to the hospital and twenty percent stated they had initiated the
admission. Approximately one half (forty-seven percent) agreed there
was no reasonable alternative to hospitalization and, in a process that
one might automatically assume involves pressure and force, thirty-five
percent of patients who were legally committed did not perceive them-
selves as having been coerced into the hospital. Of particular concern,
however, is the fact that fifty-six percent of these committed patients in-
dicated they would have entered the hospital voluntarily if they had
been given the opportunity. An obvious question arises-why wasn't
voluntary admission used? There was some suggestion that in some
cases legal status determined transportation arrangements. Involuntary
commitment just to achieve that purpose seems cumbersome-and in-
appropriate.
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D. The Need for Hospitalization-A Retrospective View by the Patient
Two hundred seventy of the patients in one sample of this study
were re-interviewed between four to eight weeks after discharge. More
than fifty percent of the re-interviewed patients who said initially that
they did not need to be hospitalized reported that, in retrospect, the de-
cision for their hospitalization was the correct one. Less than five per-
cent of those who said at the time of admission they needed such care
now said, in retrospect, such care was unnecessary. Thus, the patient's
view of hospitalization, even when coerced, can change in a positive di-
rection over time and need not be a lingering deterrent to future care,
should that become necessary.
E. Procedural Justice-An Eminently Useful Concept and Term
These Studies show that in some instances, coerced care is a reality
with major mental illness. That being the case, the most valuable les-
son-the bottom line or take home message-from this work for anyone
involved in patient or client care, whether coerced or not, in my view, is
the concept, and term, procedural justice. While in this study that term
was applied to the patients' perceptions of the ways they were treated by
others during the process of coming to and being admitted to the hospi-
tal, including the nature of pressures and coercion in that admission pro-
cess, the key elements in procedural justice are just as applicable to care
in outpatient settings where, for example, protective placements or out-
patient commitments are used as least restrictive alternatives to inpa-
tient care.
The findings here usefully show that there is a low level of perceived
coercion if: persuasion and inducement are used rather than threats or
force; others, including friends and family, are involved in the decision
making as a form of caring; the patient believes others acted out of
genuine concern; the patient believes he or she was treated respectfully
and in good faith; and the patient was afforded a chance to tell his or her
side of the story. Those elements of including of the patient/client in the
decision-making process are universally applicable to the treatment
transaction wherever, and whenever, it occurs. That they should be a
part of coerced care particularly, when it is necessary to use such, is cer-
tainly worthy of mention and emphasis and these Studies usefully do
that. Those elements remind me of the inscription above the door of a
mental hospital in Europe: "To cure sometimes-to help often-to
comfort always." These Studies, and the concept of procedural justice,
usefully remind everyone involved in the coerced care transaction that
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
there is a vital human dimension to that stringent legal process.
VI. THE "FIFTH STANDARD" IN WISCONSIN-EXPERIENCE TO DATE
I mentioned the so-called "fifth standard" earlier and a brief review
of its provisions, and experience to date, with that new need-for-
treatment provision might be useful here. In 1996, Act 292 went into ef-
fect, establishing the so-called "fifth standard" for civil commitment in
Wisconsin. This was a culmination of a fourteen-year effort by the Wis-
consin State Medical Society and the Alliance for the Mentally Ill of
Wisconsin to pass such a law.39 It provides for earlier intervention in
some instances of persons with a documented history of mental illness
before deterioration to physical dangerousness required in the four
other commitment criteria in Chapter 51, Wisconsin's Mental Health
Act. Key provisions include the following:
A substantial probability, as demonstrated by both the per-
son's treatment history and his or her recent acts and omissions,
of all of the following: a) The person needs care and treatment
to prevent further disability or deterioration; b) He or she will, if
left untreated, lack services necessary for his or her safety and
suffer severe mental, emotional or physical harm that will result
in the loss of a person's ability to function independently in the
community or loss of cognitive or volitional control over his or
her thoughts or actions. The probability of suffering severe men-
tal, emotional or physical harm is not substantial if reasonable
provision for the person's care or treatment is available in the
community and there is a reasonable probability that the person
will avail himself or herself of these services or if the person is
appropriate for protective placement; and c) an incapability of
expressing an understanding of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of accepting medication or treatment and of the alterna-
tives to the particular medication or treatment offered, after the
advantages, disadvantages and alternatives have been explained
to the person.
Emergency detention can occur using this standard but the
attorney general or designee is required to review and approve,
prior to or within 12-hours after filing, any petition using this
standard.
Inpatient treatment under this standard is limited to 30 days.
If the person is subsequently treated on an out-patient basis and
39. See Treffert, Fifth Standard, supra note 23 at 537.
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there is a violation of conditions established by the county or the
court, the patient may be transferred to an inpatient facility for
up to an additional 30 days.
Medication or treatment may be administered without the
consent of the person if, at or after the probable cause hearing
the court finds that there is probable cause to believe the person
meets the standard....
Prior to or at the final hearing the county must provide a rec-
ommended treatment plan for goals, type of treatment, expected
providers or inpatient care, and community case management
services to be used after release; [and]
When a law enforcement officer or other person so author-
ized plans to detain a child under this standard, he or she must
first consult with a mental health professional. 4°
During the legislative struggle to enact this legislation, civil liberty
opponents were concerned that such a new standard would be used as a
first, rather than last, resort and that the mental health system would be
overrun with inappropriate admissions. Ms. Dianne Greenley of the
Wisconsin Coalition for Advocacy, my co-discussant on this panel,
wrote in 1991, when she and I debated this topic in print, that such a
standard, if enacted
will cause personal pain and loss to those subject to unnecessary
commitments, will create enormous fiscal consequences for the
counties, and will undoubtedly lead to protracted litigation over
its constitutionality.... The probability that commitment will be
used as a first and not a last resort is significantly increased....
This will inevitably lead to greater hospital costs for the county
51.42 boards and human service departments. It may also lead to
the expansion of the number of beds at the state hospitals.4'
Fortunately, I can report, none of those dire consequences have oc-
curred. The "Fifth Standard" went into effect on December 1, 1996. In
the twenty-two months since that time there have been thirty-five re-
quests for commitment under this new standard (1.6 requests per
month). Thirty requests have been approved for an average of 1.4 ap-
provals per month since the enactment of this new standard. Eighty-six
40. Id. at 538.
41. Darold A. Treffert & Dianne Greenley, Face Off, 53 WIS. COUNTIES (June 1991), at
2425.
MARQ UETTE LAW REVIEW
percent of those requests have been approved. A recent letter to me
from the Assistant Attorney General states: "I can state with confi-
dence that the law works the way it was intended by the legislature. The
fifth standard is a valuable tool in the treatment of those individuals
with mental illness who do not meet the other four standards of
dangerousness in Chapter 51 of the statutes."42
Thus, there was no flood of patients to hospitals; the counties were
not bankrupted; there was no massive shift of resources away from
community mental health programs; and there has been no constitu-
tional challenge. Instead, a small number of persons with a documented
history of major mental illness who were deteriorating toward more se-
vere disability, usually because they had gone off medication which had
been effective to that point, and who were so ill as to be incapable of
understanding the need for or advantages and disadvantages of treat-
ment, were prevented from having to suffer further severe mental, emo-
tional, or physical harm before treatment intervention could occur. If
medication was to be administered without the patient's consent, the
court was required to issue an order to treat using standard criteria for
such a finding.
In these instances, not only were patients helped before further de-
terioration, but the families were spared watching their loved one dete-
riorate when, based on prior experiences, effective treatment was close
at hand.
Nevertheless, the "Fifth Standard" falls short of what many support-
ers of that legislation would have liked to have seen enacted. Those
persons with first-time psychotic episodes, who can also rapidly deterio-
rate to dangerousness narrowly defined, are not subject to this legisla-
tion. While some supporters (including myself) were dubious about the
Attorney General's office being immediately available twenty-four
hours per day seven days a week for approval of these petitions in a
timely fashion, such availability has in fact been afforded to all the coun-
ties in the state within the strict timelines of the legislation. Not all
counties have used filed petitions under this standard; some find it too
restrictive or too cumbersome. Others adapt the four dangerousness
standards to specific patient circumstances in a less rigid, more flexible
manner. They "adapt" the present statutory language in a manner used
in other states and other jurisdictions. That, however, is a sporadic jus-
tice and depends on the cooperativeness, and flexibility, of the district
42. Letter from Joseph Thomas, Assistant Attorney General, State of Wisconsin De-
partment of Justice (Sep. 28, 1998) (on file with author).
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attorney or corporation counsel, the patient's attorney or public de-
fender, and the judge in any particular county. Prompt treatment of
mentally ill persons, it seems to me, to the extent legal processes help
determine such access, should not depend upon which county the person
happens to be in. Some of these problems with the present Fifth Stan-
dard provisions perhaps can be rectified with future revisions of that
particular section of the law.
VII. BANDWAGONS AND ANOTHER GLANCE BACK
In summary, these MacArthur Studies on coercion in mental health
care are welcome and overdue. They begin by first carefully defining
coerced care, and then usefully point out that equating involuntary
treatment (civil commitment) with coerced care and voluntary treat-
ment with non-coerced care is a far too narrow and out-dated paradigm.
Likewise, equating civil commitment with traditional inpatient status is
also an out-moded model given outpatient commitment statutes that
exist in many states along with other creatively adapted statutes that
permit modified guardianships, protective placements, conditional re-
leases, and settlement agreements to maintain some form of "coerced"
treatment status. Coercion is not always harmful, these Studies demon-
strate, and in some instances, major mental illness being what it is, co-
erced treatment is simply a stark clinical reality, and it can be a useful
necessity.
Coerced care need not be an oxymoron. To achieve that, however,
coercion, whenever it is used, must be the least intrusive possible, and
should always contain elements of procedural justice such as genuine
concern, good faith, respect, listening to the patient's side of the story,
and involvement of important persons in the patient's life in the deci-
sion-making process. Persuasion and inducements should supersede le-
gal maneuvers or force. For an assessment to be accurate and inclusive
regarding the effects of coercion on outcome, it will be necessary to
compare and contrast not just carefully defined coerced care versus vol-
untary care, but situations of "no care" with voluntary care and coerced
care. The work to date already confirms that the majority of mental
treatment occurs on a voluntary, not coerced, basis; that patient inter-
views are a more accurate measure of "coercion" than legal status; that
involuntary commitment is not synonymous with denial and protest and
that procedural justice is an eminently useful concept. Further work will
produce many more useful findings for wide application by both psy-
chiatry and law, muting, hopefully, some of the more strident polariza-
tion that has characterized the debate between some clinicians, some at-
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torneys, and some advocates.
Part of that strident debate has been based on all-or-nothing ap-
proaches to an interface between clinical realities and legal rights that
are not so easily divisible. Part of that debate has been fueled by a
bandwagon mentality, and subsequent pendulum swings, first too lib-
eral, then too narrow and back again. These more objective studies will
mute that stridency somewhat, hopefully, and produce fewer bandwag-
ons. Looking back in time a bit, to provide some perspective, may help.
In 1870, there was a raging debate in mental hospital circles about the
usefulness of and necessity of restraint for mentally ill persons (a debate
that rages still). Dr. Kempster wisely viewed it, in 1887, thusly:
I am reasonably suspicious of all physicians who advocate in their
reports and in conventions the system of absolute non-restraint.
We know ... that in... some instances, the use of restraint was
abused, and its application resorted to when milder and more
appropriate remedies would have done better. But because a
remedy has been abused, we must not go to the other extreme
and refuse to use it at all when we know in a few instances it is
the best of all remedies. The world moves by extremes, by
popular enthusiasm. Just now it is fashionable to be a reformer,
and the fashion in hospital reform is to abandon the camisole and
put on another garment, called non-restraint. Ever and anon,
men in the magnitude of their inexperience are popping up here
and there, ablaze and bristling with new theories, proclaiming
them to the world as superior to all established laws, and the
tried old custom of their fathers fed and grew prosperous. Yet
we can hardly do without them. They stir up the old and sluggish
blood and set new brains to thinking. The true man of science
never goes off on tangents.43
These MacArthur Studies, done by men and women of true science,
do not go off on tangents and they do stir up sluggish blood and set new
brains to thinking. They provide a lighthouse of reality from which we
can embark to search, as best we can, together, to find that reasonable
middle ground between the right to be sick and the right to be rescued.
And they can help us to be sure scrupulous concern for legal rights does
not overshadow reasonable concern for the patient's life. And if we
come away with better implementation of procedural justice-respect,
43. Darold A. Treffert, Psychiatry Revolves as It Evolves, 17 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY
72, 73 (1967).
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listening, dignity-we all, whatever our role in these efforts, will be the
better for it.
How to judge our success? One final look back. In 1873, Dr. Kemp-
ster, looking a century back at efforts over that previous one hundred
years, provides a yardstick we can apply to our efforts in 1998, even at
this conference.
The results attained in the past one hundred years are certainly
gratifying, and should stimulate us to carry forward the good
work, constantly endeavoring to advance the interest of the peo-
ple in whose cause we are engaged, so that, when the record of
the next one hundred years shall be written up, it [can] be said of
us, that our eyes were not altogether blinded, or that, with the
light we had, our opportunities [did not go unimproved].'
Hopefully, whoever might look back at our efforts and our enlight-
enment a century from now, in 2098, will say of us, at this conference on
Competency, Coercion, and Risk of Violence at the Renaissance Place
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1998, that our eyes were not altogether
blinded, or that with the light we had, we did pretty well.
44. Id. at 74.

